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1. Introduction
This chapter explores a number of conceptual and modeling issues that are
germane to the analysis of conflict in international economic relations. Section II
immediately following is devoted to a number of issues involving conflict that have been
treated in the theory of international trade. The discussion focuses on departures from the
free trade optimum that is the center piece of the theory of comparative advantage and the
gains from trade. Also considered are conflict situations stemming from departures from
full employment and external balance that figure importantly in international
macroeconomic theory. In Section III, I draw on one of my research specialties, which is
the use of computational models to analyze international economic relations and policies.
In particular, I discuss the design and implementation of the Michigan Model of World
Production and Trade, which is a multi-country and multi-sector general equilibrium model
of the international trading system that my Michigan colleague, Alan V. Deardorff, and I
have been working with since the mid-1970s. Four applications of the Michigan Model are
discussed in order to illustrate how the model has been used to provide quantitative
analysis of potentially conflictual and cooperative international economic actions and
policies. Some concluding remarks are made in Section IV.
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II. Conceptual and Modeling Issues in the Analysis of Conflict
in International Economic Relations
The Theory of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade
It may be useful to begin our discussion by reviewing briefly the theory of
comparative advantage and the gains from trade, which is the central focus of
international trade theory.
In the simplest version of this theory, it is assumed that there are two industries
located in each of two countries that exist in isolation (autarky), and there is perfect
competition in all markets for goods and factors of production. The productivity of factors
(e.g., labor and capital) employed in the industries in each country is assumed to be
different for unspecified technological reasons, which means that the relative prices of the
two goods will be different under conditions of autarky. It is this difference in autarky
prices that gives rise to the possibility of international specialization and mutually
beneficial trade. Thus, if trade is permitted to occur, each country will specialize in the
production and export of the good in which it has the greatest comparative advantage or
least comparative disadvantage compared to the other country. This means that factors of
production in each country will be shifted towards the country's export industry and away
from what will become its import-competing industry. Factors of production are assumed
to be perfectly mobile between industries within each country, but not to move between
countries.
The assumption of perfect competition guarantees that there will be optimum use
of factors of production since firms are not able to control the price at which they sell their
output and will maximize their profits by simply equating their costs at the margin with
the given market price. Individual consumers are assumed to have given preferences and
to act rationally in making consumption decisions with respect to the market prices that
are given to them and subject to a budget constraint imposed by the size of their incomes.
As mentioned, factors of production will move frictionlessly between industries as firms
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expand or contract output. Given the assumption of no barriers to the entry and exit of
firms and the domestic movement of factors, this means that the role of government is
designed primarily to foster competition and to maintain the social order. It will be evident
that this "ideal" state of affairs will emerge as firms and consumers pursue their self
interest. It is as if there were an "invisible hand" guiding the process.
The concept and ideal of free trade have remained at the core of international
trade theory for more than two centuries. What is interesting for our purpose here is that
unfettered international specialization and exchange will be welfare maximizing and that
economic conflict does not appear therefore to be an issue. This should not be taken to
mean, however, that international trade theory ends at this point, for this is certainly not
the case. Rather, a great deal of attention has been devoted in the past half century or
more to the theoretical analysis of departures from the free trade optimum. International
economic conflict figures importantly in several of these cases that involve efforts by
nations to engage in exploitative behavior that will improve their welfare at the expense of
other nations. Let us turn then to consider the issues involved in analyzing various
departures from the free trade optimum.
Departures from the Free Trade Optimum
National Monopoly Power and the Optimum Tariff
The idealized assumptions of the classic argument for free trade imply the
optimality of free trade only for the world as a whole. For individual countries, the
optimality of free trade requires the additional assumption that the country is too small to
have any influence, through its policies, over the prices at which it trades. Without this
assumption, free trade is not optimal from a national perspective, and instead there exists
an optimal degree of government intervention in trade, known as the optimal tariff, that
works by turning the country's terms of trade in its favor.
iThe discussion that follows is drawn in part from Deardorff and Stern (1987a).
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This argument is sometimes thought to require that the country in question be
large and therefore to apply only to such large, industrialized countries as the United
States. However, the size that is important is not the size of the country as a whole but
rather its share of world trade in markets in which it exports and imports. Since many
countries tend to specialize their exports in a fairly small range of goods- as the theory of
comparative advantage predicts they should-even quite small countries may have enough
market power over the prices of their exports for the optimal tariff argument to apply.
The optimal tariff argument has the important feature that it involves a benefit
for the intervening country only at the expense of the country's trading partners. Indeed,
since free trade is optimal for the world as a whole, it must be true that the rest of the
world loses more than the tariff-levying country gains. It should be evident that a country
that attempts to take advantage of its monopoly power in trade will create a situation of
conflict with its major trading partners. The possibility of retaliation thus looms large in
this setting, and it is likely to be the case that all countries will lose if they simultaneousjy
pursue this kind of policy. This suggests that there may be complicated and perhaps
unsolvable strategic issues that will arise when one or more countries attempt to exercise
national monopoly power in foreign trade. But the more that governments realize the
potentially damaging effects of optimal tariff intervention and retaliation, the more likely
they might be to avoid taking such measures in the first place. Of course, this does not
mean that national governments will always recognize the potential losses from their
actions, in which case the world will be made worse off.
"Second-Best" Arguments for Government Intervention
A crucial assumption underlying the classic gains-from-trade proposition is that
everything within the domestic economy is working properly: all domestic markets are
perfectly competitive, prices and wages adjust freely so that markets clear, and that
private and social costs and benefits coincide so that there are no positive or negative
externalities or spillovers that arise in production or consumption. If any of the foregoing
5
conditions fails to hold, there exists a "domestic distortion," and the first-best optimal
results of free trade are no longer assured. There may be grounds therefore for
government intervention to correct domestic distortions and thereby restore the first-best
optimum.
What is interesting and important here is that government intervention in trade
may not be the best policy to use when there are domestic distortions. Suppose, for
example, that firms are producing an insufficient amount of a good that confers a positive
external benefit on society. An import tariff could be used to encourage domestic
production, but this would distort consumer choice and welfare because of the higher
domestic price involved. In this circumstance, a production subsidy would be the best
policy to use since it would lead firms to increase their output of the good that confers
positive social benefit while leaving consumers free to consume at undistorted market
prices. The optimal or first-best policy is the one that addresses the original distortion
most directly. A tariff is thus second-best compared to a subsidy. By introducing two
distortions rather than one; trade intervention may succeed in solving one problem but
only at the same time that it causes another.2
Similar examples are rife in the theory of protection. The classic example is the
"infant industry" argument, where a tariff is said to protect a young industry while it
learns to be efficient. The assumption here is that some market failure- such as an
imperfection in the loan market or the impossibility of keeping new technical knowledge
from being copied-makes it impossible for competitive firms to take advantage of what
would otherwise be a profitable opportunity. A tariff or other import restriction can
therefore be used temporarily to make the operation profitable even in the short run while
the learning process is underway. Naturally, though, the success of such a policy depends
crucially on a correct diagnosis of which industries offer the potential for such
2Alan Deardorff-see Deardorff and Stern (198 7a, p. 39)-has likened trade policy to
"doing acupuncture with a fork: no matter how carefully you insert one prong, the other is
like to do damage."
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improvement over time. Also it may be difficult politically to remove protection once it has
been put in place.
As in the case of the production externality discussed above, the infant industry
argument may be valid in the sense that a tariff may be beneficial. But it is also true that
some other policy would be superior. Once again a production subsidy, equal in size to the
tariff, would yield the same benefits to producers as the tariff without causing the
additional costly distortion of consumer choice. Even better might be a policy that
subsidizes or guarantees loans to the industry, if the capital market was the real source of
the distortion, or a policy that permits firms to appropriate technology if that was the
problem.
Many other arguments for intervention can similarly be traced to the presumption
of a distortion somewhere in the domestic economy. But what should be stressed in all of
these cases is the need for a correct diagnosis of the distortions at issue and the point that
they could be better dealt with by means other than trade policies. While this kind of
reasoning is generally accepted by most international trade economists, it is not by any
means accepted by practical policymakers who are in the business of trying to make only
marginal improvements in the economic environment. If they can find some feasible policy
that will work, they are unlikely to worry that some other policy might have worked
better.
Thus, it may be argued that first-best policies are politically unacceptable and
therefore that trade interference, though only second best in economic theory, may be first
best in terms of political reality. This rnay be true, but it is a dangerous argument for
several reasons. First, if trade intervention is politically more acceptable than domestic
taxes and subsidies, it is probably because its true effects are less well understood by the
electorate. If the public would not approve a direct subsidy to an industry, for whatever
reason, then that fact should perhaps be taken as evidence that protection of that industry
through trade intervention is also socially undesirable because of the consumption
7
distortions involved. Second, it is always a very difficult empirical question whether the
benefits of offsetting a domestic distortion exceed the costs that arise from the second
distortion caused by trade intervention. While it is very difficult to calculate precise
estimates of the costs and benefits of different policies, there is nonetheless substantial
empirical evidence that suggests that the net effects of trade intervention are detrimental
to welfare. A very strong case can thus be made for using first-best policies. A final and
important consideration for our purpose here is that reliance on first-best policies to correct
domestic distortions avoids the potential for conflict between nations that trade
intervention entails.
Trade Intervention in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
Recognizing that many markets, domestic and international, are imperfectly
competitive, growing attention has been directed in recent years to analysis of trade and
trade policy in an imperfectly competitive world. It is clear that the classical case for the
gains from trade does not apply directly in such a world. However, we do not yet have a
very clear understanding of the alternatives. Instead we have several suggestive ideas
about the role of trade policy in particular situations that have not yet been established
with any generality.
The first such idea is probably also the most important and is also very simple. If
a domestic market is not competitive, competition can be fostered by removing barriers to
trade. Often a major reason that domestic markets are dominated by a small number of
producers is that these producers are protected from foreign competition by tariffs or other
trade restrictions. If given a choice, producers for the domestic market will opt for
quantitative import restrictions, since these increase the profit that can be made by
monopoly pricing in the domestic market. The trade policy that will best improve this
situation does not require any subtle effort to offset the effects of monopoly power.
Instead a simple opening of markets to free international trade will rernove the market
power itself and restore the benefits of competition. A domestic rnarket with only a few
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domestic firms may therefore approximate free competition if those few firms must
compete with a larger number of foreign producers. The removal of trade barriers in these
circumstances will accordingly remove a source of international conflict and promote
national and world welfare.
Unfortunately, there is sometimes no assurance that even worldwide free trade
will confer the benefits of perfect competition in all markets. Some products are not
tradable or are not readily available as substitutes from abroad. In addition, the world
market itself may be imperfectly competitive, due perhaps to the historical dominance of a
few firms or the nature of the product. Many products in today's international trade more
and more seem to lend themselves to product differentiation and the use of large-scale and
aggressive marketing techniques. In such cases, while free trade still increases
competition, the nature of that competition is sufficiently imperfect that the benefits from
it are no longer assured.
Two issues 'need to be addressed here. First, to what extent are our earlier
arguments undermined by the persistence of imperfect competition even under free trade?
In particular, is it still true that trade intervention constitutes only a second-best means of
dealing with domestic distortions? Second, do imperfect market structures give rise to any
new arguments for trade intervention other than the traditional ones?
The first question just mentioned cannot be answered definitively since there is no
single model of imperfect competition that can provide the basis for a conclusive proof.
But, as shown in Deardorff and Stern (1987a, pp. 43-44), it seems likely that the general
principle favoring a domestic policy rather than trade intervention to rernove a distortion
would continue to hold in cases of imperfect competition.
As for the second question, free trade may fail to ensure perfect competition even
in traded goods if world markets are not perfectly competitive. If world markets are
monopolistic or controlled by a small number of oligopolistic firms and excess profits are
being made at the expense of either foreign or domestic consumers, this suggests that
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trade intervention may benefit a country if it is able to capture a larger share of these
profits. This idea has considerable appeal. Certainly politically if you must be exploited, it
is better to be exploited by domestic residents than by foreigners. Even economically there
may be a valid case for trade intervention. Two possible cases are considered in Deardorff
and Stern (1987a, pp. 46-50).
The first involves an effort to capture a portion of foreign monopoly profits by
means of an import tariff. In this case, the importing country gains from the tariff only if
the price paid to the foreign monopolist falls. The tariff works here much like the optimum
tariff mentioned above in so far as it improves the importing country's terms of trade.
But, as before, a situation of conflict is created and there is no guarantee that this profit-
seeking policy will succeed if the foreign government retaliates by taking measures on its
own to prevent or offset the shifting of profits abroad.
A second case involves the use of trade intervention to alter the outcomes of
"strategic games" played by imperfectly competitive firms so as to increase the profits that
can be shared by them with their sponsoring governments. In effect, the government uses
its policy to precommit firms to behavior that would otherwise appear to be-and be known
by their competitors to be-suboptimal. It turns out that the theoretical models used in
generating such results are rather fragile conceptually so that changes in key assumptions
can be shown to negate or even reverse the conclusion that profit shifting is possible.
Furthermore, this case for intervention is once again exploitative and therefore may give
rise to retaliation. Thus, if both governments were to try to play this particular game,
both countries will be worse off. Again, to the extent that this is recognized by
governments who desist from exploitative measures, it reduces the scope for international
conflict.
Countervailing and Strategic Intervention
However one may feel about the case in economic theory for free trade, the fact
remains that countries do make extensive use of policies that interfere with trade, perhaps
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for the reasons that have been discussed. This raises the question of whether the cases for
and against intervention are altered at all for countries whose trading partners use such
policies.
There seem to be two distinct rationales for responding to the trade policies of
other countries. One is to try to neutralize, offset, or countervail the presumed adverse
effects of a foreign country's trade policies. The other is to try strategically to discourage
the use of such policies by foreign countries by threatening, or actually implementing,
policies that will affect them adversely. The difference between these two approaches is
the following. In the former case the policy is to be chosen with a view to benefiting the
domestic economy directly. In the latter case, since the purpose of the policy is to alter
behavior abroad, a policy might be chosen in spite of having adverse effects domestically.
Countervailing intervention makes sense only if it benefits the domestic economy
on its own account. It is not enough that it partially undoes the effect of the foreign
country trade policy to which it responds. The familiar example of this use of trade policy
is the national and GATT-sanctioned use of countervailing duties to offset the effect of
foreign export subsidies. This countervailing policy normally does benefit the country
using it, but only to the extent that the importing country is large enough to improve its
terms of trade by imposing the duty. Where this is the case, the country could have
benefited from a duty even had there been no foreign subsidy, assuming that it could have
avoided retaliation. The question then is whether the fact of the subsidy, together perhaps
with the official sanctioning of a countervailing duty, reduces the likelihood of retaliation.
Only in this case does it appear that the use of a countervailing duty is a responsible policy
in a competitive environment.
If instead we have an imperfectly competitive world, subsidies may be used to
give a country's producers a competitive edge in a foreign market. In this case, a
countervailing duty of some sort may be an optimal response on the part of the importing
country's government as it tries to balance the gain from cheaper subsidized imports
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against the loss of monopoly profit earned by its domestic firms. While this is a possibility,
it suggests the more general question of whether countervailing measures may be justified
as a means of discouraging the use of export subsidies in the first place. This takes us into
the topic of strategic intervention.
We have seen that there are a number of arguments suggesting that trade
intervention may benefit one country at the expense of others. Many of these arguments,
relating especially to national monopoly power and use of the optimal tariff, have long
been familiar to international trade economists. But interest in the analysis of trade under
conditions of imperfect competition has seemed to expand the scope for strategic
intervention and in turn has led to new interest in the strategic issues of how countries
may use intervention to exploit others and to keep from being exploited by them. Rather
than attempt here to discuss particular contributions that have been made in the
literature, it is perhaps of greater importance to focus attention on the question of how
policymakers should act in a world'of exploitative trade intervention.
In simple terms, what we have is the classic Prisoners' Dilemma game, in which
each player has an incentive to act at the other's expense, and both lose if both act.
Although it is clearly optimal for them collectively to refrain from acting (from intervening
in trade), each has an incentive to depart from that optimum if it is ever reached. What is
interesting here, according to analyses by trade theorists such as Thursby and Jensen
(1983) and political scientists such as Axelrod (1983), is that the greater is the perceived
likelihood that a government expects that its trade intervention will be retaliated against,
the closer will the solution lie to free trade. This suggests that although trade intervention
itself is harmful for reasons already discussed, it may nonetheless be desirable that
countries expect intervention by other countries in response to intervention they
themselves may undertake.
Alternatively one could attempt to pursue negotiated solutions to games such as
the foregoing. Such negotiations, however, pose the well known problem of enforcing
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whatever agreement is reached. On the other hand, the incentives to enter into such
negotiations are strong, even if one has no intention of abiding by their outcome. It is
therefore not surprising that the trade policy community has managed to keep such
negotiations going during a large part of post-World War II history.
Trade Intervention for Foreign Policy Reasons
The strategic uses of trade intervention just discussed were focused specifically on
influencing analogous policies abroad. But trade intervention is sometimes also used as a
means of influencing foreign policies that have nothing to do with trade. Because countries
depend on and gain from trade, policies that interfere with trade can serve as weapons and
can be used for a variety of aims. Still, one must ask whether trade intervention can
succeed in changing foreign country policies and, if so, whether it is worth the cost.
To take the second issue first, trade as a political weapon makes sense only if it is
capable of inflicting relatively a lot of harm abroad compared to any disruption it causes at
home. For too small a country this would clearly not be the case, but for a large country
like the United States, it does seem likely that we could do rather severe damage to at
least some of our smaller trading partners at relatively little obvious cost to ourselves.
But one must be very careful here, especially because markets often work far better than
anyone expects. Even the United States might find that long-run effects of its policies will
go against it in ways that would be hard to predict. When foreign markets and foreign
suppliers are lost, either because the United States accidentally hurts them more than
intended or because they look elsewhere for a more certain trading environment, the U.S.
claim that it was only manipulating trade to promote the general welfare will fall on deaf
ears.
There is also reason to doubt that even draconian trade policies such as
embargoes can ever be very effective in changing the behavior of foreign governments and
their constituencies. Trade can have powerful effects. But when used as a weapon, it
seems more likely to generate resistance, rather than fear, in the hearts of its victims.
13
The world's considerable experience with the use of embargoes does not suggest that they
have been very successful in drawing concessions from those they were intended to
influence. On the other hand, it is conceivable that trade policy might be more successful
in influencing policies abroad if it were oriented toward providing positive rather than
negative incentives in the political sphere. This is certainly worth exploring further.
International Factor Movements
It was noted in our earlier discussion of the theory of comparative advantage and
the gains from trade that factors of production were assumed to move costlessly between
industries within countries but not to move internationally. While this assumption of
international factor immobility helps to clarify the role of trade and its impact on the
returns to factors of production, it is of course unrealistic in view of the often substantial
movements of labor and capital from one country to another that in fact occur.
For our purpose here, it is movements of real capital rather than financial capital
that are important. Such movements of real capital constitute foreign direct investment
(FDI) by international firms. There is a large body of theory of the determinants of FDI,
but its main motivation derives from the apparent profitability involved in the internal
control by the parent company of the operations of foreign affiliates. There are significant
gains in economic efficiency and consumer welfare in both investing and host countries that
result from FDI. But in some circumstances there may be costs as well, and conflicts may
emerge as governments seek to regulate the investment activities of international firms.
In host countries, for example, disputes may arise if it is believed that foreign firms can
charge monopoly prices and thus earn excessive profits that they then transfer abroad in
large measure. There may be complaints that indigenous workers are not given adequate
opportunity to acquire skills and training, and that the host country is held back because it
cannot acquire and develop foreign technologies on its own. It may be believed
furthermore that foreign firms undermine the efficacy of host country economic policies
and maybe even threaten host country political sovereignty. As for investing countries,
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they may have their own concerns about the loss of jobs and technological benefits,
including spillover effects, as operations are transferred abroad. Strategic and national
defense considerations may also be important in some cases.
Population movements between countries have been taking place for centuries for
both economic and political reasons. These movements have been subject to varying
degrees of control and restriction, depending upon the historical circumstances and
countries involved. It is generally accepted that host countries maintain the right to limit
immigration, whereas countries that attempt to constrain emigration especially for political
reasons may be subject to international criticism. Just as in the case of FDI, the
international movement of labor may be beneficial to both the sending and receiving
countries in so far as it increases economic efficiency and welfare. But there may be costs
here as well. The sending country may lose as its stock of human capital is diminished,
particularly since those who leave may be among the most skilled and highly productive
.workers. Offsetting effects here would include somewhat higher wages for those that
remain and the receipt of remittances from those who moved abroad. In the receiving
country, immigration may displace domestic workers and result in lower wages, and there
may be added social costs depending upon the use that immigrants make of the available
social infrastructure.
It is evident then that FDI and the international movement of labor may provide
the basis for conflict between nations, apart from the conflicts that may arise as countries
attempt to deal with the various departures from the free trade optimum that have been
discussed. What is interesting here is that the international community has not developed
mechanisms and institutions for dealing with problems posed by FDI and the international
movement of workers. Policies here remain the province of individual nations.
Departures from Full Employment / External Balance
The standard model of comparative advantage and the gains frorn trade assumes
that all factors of production are continuously ernployed, given that markets for goods,
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services, and factors are perfectly competitive and function smoothly. Any unemployment
of factors that occurs is treated as if it were a domestic distortion arising from difficulties
in adjustment especially in the short or medium run or because of the existence of market
imperfections that act as a barrier to entry or exit of factors in particular sectors. As was
discussed, the first-best policy to deal with distortions is a domestic tax/subsidy that is
directed at the source of the distortion. Trade policy will generally be second best or even
worse than second best because of the production and consumption costs involved.
This same conclusion applies at the macroeconomic level. Departures from full
employment may occur for a variety of reasons. For example, there may be exogenous
real shocks due to an unexpected increase in oil prices or some other type of supply
disruption. It is also possible that there may be unemployment or inflationary pressures
because of cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. Such fluctuations may originate
domestically or be transmitted from other countries via induced changes in imports and
exports and international capital movements. Finally, changes in monetary and/or fiscal
policies may in themselves constitute a disturbance that will affect aggregate employment
and involve international transmission effects working through changes in foreign trade
and capital flows.
A moment's reflection suggests that these types of disturbances can have
profound effects on aggregate employment, prices, the balance of payments, and exchange
rates, and, accordingly, give rise to conflictual situations internationally as countries seek
to offset the domestic consequences of the disturbances or to shield themselves from the
adverse transmission of foreign influences. Trade intervention seems obviously a
suboptimal way of dealing with these macroeconomic disturbances when the underlying
problems stem from difficulties of adjustment in the markets for goods and services, labor,
and foreign exchange.
International macroeconomic issues and problems have been analyzed at length
over the years. To relate these issues and problems to the subject of this chapter, it may
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be helpful to distinguish between the defensive and offensive uses of policies in trying to
cope with various types of macroeconomic disturbances and interactions. For example, if a
country were to impose import restrictions to raise the level of employment and improve
its current account balance, this could be considered an offensive policy since it would
represent an effort by one country to improve its position at the expense of another. A
currency devaluation designed for the same purpose would work similarly since it would
improve conditions in the home country while at the same time worsening conditions
abroad. Policies designed to improve a country's macroeconomic performance through
changes in exports and imports thus appear to be exploitative, and, to the extent that
other countries may respond in kind, output and employment will be reduced at home and
abroad. By the same line of reasoning, the defensive use of macroeconomic policies may
appear to be justified if a country wishes to shield itself from the effects of foreign induced
changes in international trade and capital movements.
There is a very interesting and important lesson of macroeconomic policy that has
emerged from the foregoing theoretical reasoning that is similar to our earlier point
concerning first-best policies. The difference here arises from the international
transmission effects noted. Thus, suppose for example that we have two countries that
are both experiencing a recession or inflation. In either case, the optimal policy for each
country would be to undertake domestic expansionary or contractionary macroeconomic
policies designed to deal with the unemployment or inflationary pressures. If one country
were to use trade or exchange-rate policies, this would be exploitative since it would
exaggerate the other country's problems.
One can also imagine situations in which one country may be experiencing a
recession and another country experiencing inflationary pressure. Depending on the type
of exchange-rate system in effect, this may or may not result in a conflict situation. It will
if exchange rates are fixed since expansionary dornestic policies in the country with the
recession will worsen the country's current account balance and have opposite effects
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abroad, and conversely if the country with inflation were to implement contractionary
domestic policies. This problem does not arise, at least in theory, if the exchange rate is
flexible since the exchange-rate movement should help to stabilize each economy.
In any event, the point is that there might be conditions when international
harmony will be obtained by nations introducing macroeconomic policies that are targeted
on domestic objectives. But international disharmony may ensue if countries use trade or
exchange-rate measures for dealing with domestic problems or if countries introduce
incorrect domestic macroeconomic policies that work in a destabilizing manner
internationally. In these instances, it may be desirable accordingly for countries to
attempt to cooperate by coordinating their policy actions rather than going it alone.
V. A Computational Modeling Approach to Analyzing Multilateral
Trading Arrangements and Policies
The preceding discussion was intended to clarify the issues that arise in the
analysis of conflict between nations when there are departures from the free trade
optimum or departures from full employment/external balance. We now turn to one line of
applied economic research-computational modeling-that has been used extensively to
investigate a variety of important issues of potential policy conflicts and cooperation in the
global trading system. The focus here will be on the Michigan Model of World Production
and Trade.
The Michigan Model was developed initially in the mid-1970s to analyze the
economic effects of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the GATT. It is
a computer-based general equilibrium model of the world trading system, providing
sectoral detail for the 18 major industrialized countries, 16 major developing countries, and
the rest-of-world. Complete details on the theoretical structure and equations of the model,
data, and solution procedure are given in Deardorff and Stern (1986).
Of the many applications of the Michigan Model that have been carried out over
the years, four have been chosen for discussion here. These include: (1) analysis of
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unilateral U.S. introduction of tariffs coupled with defensive responses of other major
trading countries; (2) safeguards policies to deal with import disruptions; (3) evaluation of
alternative negotiating options in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations;
and (4) comparison of the employment effects of a unilateral U.S. embargo and a
multilateral embargo by all major Western trading countries on the export and import of
armaments.
Tariffs and Defensive Responses
One important source of conflict in the international economic system in the
1980s stems from the disruptive effects of the Reagan Administration's monetary/fiscal
policy mix on the U.S. foreign sector. At the political level in the United States, it is
probably understood, though not always.acknowledged readily in public statements, that
the U.S. foreign trade imbalance is a macroeconomic phenomenon related to the U.S.
budget imbalance. Yet, because a political stalemate has developed over whether to raise
taxes and/or reduce expenditures in order to reduce the budget deficit, emphasis has been
shifted instead to trying to correct the U.S. trade deficit. Thus, in 1985 and 1986
especially, a spate of legislative proposals designed to assist trade-impacted sectors of the
economy were introduced in the Congress. Several of these proposals involved the
imposition of a general tariff surcharge on U.S. imports from all sources as a well as a
surcharge on imports from countries with large bilateral trade surpluses vis-a-vis the
United States.
U.S. legislation actually condones the use of import restrictions under certain
specified conditions, although, if the United States were to act unilaterally to impose an
import surcharge, it would technically be in violation of its obligations under the GATT not
to increase its statutory tariff rates. It would also be subject to foreign retaliation under
GATT provisions. But this is not to say that circumstances might arise in which the
United States did decide to act. unilaterally. To investigate this issue, the Michigan Model
was used to determine how our major trading partners might respond to the imposition of
19
a unilateral U.S. import surcharge. The alternative responses of our trading partners
include: (1) passive acceptance of the U.S. import surcharge; (2) defensive response
designed to neutralize the adverse effects of the surcharge; and (3) retaliation in kind,
either on a multilateral basis or with reference to all or selected categories of U.S. exports
to the country.
As described in Deardorff and Stern (1987b), the modeling procedure followed was
first to assume that the United States imposed a general import surcharge of 10% on
imports from all sources, and that initially there were no changes of any kind implemented
abroad. This would indicate what might be expected if there were passive acceptance of
the U.S. action. It would also be indicative of the initial effects of the import surcharge
prior to any reaction abroad. Assuming that our major trading partners had certain
objectives that they wished to attain with respect to avoiding worsening of their terms of
trade, balance of trade, and aggregate employment, the model was used to calculate how
each country might be affected by the surcharge. Further calculations were then carried
out to determine how large a surcharge would be required in each country in order to undo
the adverse effects that the U.S. surcharge might have.
The results are interesting in so far as six industrialized countries- Australia,
Austria, Canada, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland-showed a zero response. This is
because a U.S. surcharge might affect them positively or because their own responses to a
U.S. surcharge might prove detrimental to them. But what is also interesting is that the
results suggest that these countries might not be spared damage since they could be
affected adversely by actions that other countries might take in response to the U.S.
action. The results further suggested that Japan, West Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom would be adversely affected by the U.S. action and might feel compelled to
introduce countermeasures to defend themselves. But he results showed the defensive
responses of these countries to be rather complex because a given country might not know
or be able to anticipate the effects of the responses of all other countries.
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Of course, it would be most desirable for the international economic system if the
United States were to avoid introducing an import surcharge in the first place. But what
this modeling exercise revealed was that some of our trading partners would be spared
damage from a U.S. import surcharge because the main effects would be felt by other
countries. And, further, for those countries that might be adversely affected, it would be
difficult for them to frame an appropriate response unless they could determine the
outcome of the complex interactions affecting all of the major countries in the world
trading system. In any event, since a retaliatory process would make things worse for all
those nations directly involved, this could reinforce the incentive for international
cooperation.
Safeguards Policies
Nations may at times be subjected to a sudden surge of imports that can be
disruptive to firms and workers in an import-competing industry. It is in recognition of the
possible adjustment problems that can occur in these circumstances that safeguards or
escape clause arrangements have become part of national trade laws and have been
incorporated into the Articles of the GATT. While these formal arrangements have
unfortunately been bypassed by the use of other means of "administered protection" in
many importing countries, it remains the case that an import surge routinely gives rise to
some sort of protective response in the affected country or countries. What is interesting
for our purpose here is that policy responses to import surges are often implemented
without much consideration of their effects on other trading countries. Since safeguards
issues are currently (1989) being addressed in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, it appeared worthwhile to examine the implications, both for the world
economy and for the protected industries, of the systematic use of safeguards policies of
various types.
Thus, in Deardorff and Stern (1989a), the Michigan Model was used to analyze
the effects of alternative safeguards policies that might be undertaken by the United
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States and other industrialized countries in response to an unexpected surge in the imports
of clothing from developing countries. This particular experiment was chosen in light of
the crucial importance especially to the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of continuing
access to the import markets of the advanced countries. The objective was to explore the
general equilibrium effects of alternative safeguards policies across both industries and
countries, taking into account the possibility that an import surge is likely to affect not just
one country but many and consequently that safeguards actions will be pursued by many
importing countries simultaneously.
The procedure followed was to assume that there was a 10% increase in clothing
imports in all of the major industrialized countries at the same time. The model was then
solved for the effects of this import surge on trade and employment in all sectors for the 34
countries covered in the model. The results of this solution were then used to construct a
variety of safeguards policies responding to the import surge, based on the effects that the
surge was calculated to have in the absence of any policy response. The policy responses
were then introduced into the model together with the import surge itself in order to
calculate the effects of the two together. Eight alternative policy responses to the import
surge were explored, including: (1) maintenance of existing quotas on clothing imports in
all industrialized countries; (2) a unilateral U.S. tariff on clothing imports; (3) a unilateral
U.S. quota on clothing imports; (4) a multilateral tariff by all industrialized importing
countries; (5) a multilateral import quota; (6) a unilateral U.S. production subsidy to
domestic clothing producers; (7) a multilateral production subsidy to domestic clothing
producers; and (8) a multilateral subsidy to keep employment unchanged in all industries.
What is interesting about the results is that the use of import protection-tariffs
and quotas-turned out to be questionable even when practiced by only one country, since
it shifted the burden of adjustment onto other countries. Furthermore, when protective
safeguards actions were assumed to be taken by countries multilaterally, then even the
beneficial effects in the protecting countries were undermined to some extent. This was
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especially the case since the protective policies served to raise the prices of production
inputs in the protecting countries, thus having adverse effects on employment and output
in export industries and perhaps also in the clothing industry itself. It was not clear
therefore that the industrialized countries as a group would gain collectively from using
trade policy measures for safeguards purposes. In contrast, when domestic policies were
assumed to be used in dealing with the assumed import surge, they were noticeably more
effective in limiting the decline in employment. This was particularly the case for the
multilateral production subsidy-policy 7 above-which seemed capable of achieving what
trade policies could not: a marked improvement in the employment situation in all
industrialized countries.
The results of the Michigan Model experiments thus suggest that unilateral
safeguards measures may shift adjustment burdens onto other countries and that trade
policy measures may be particularly detrimental to the importing countries' own interests.
Unilateral policy responses to an import surge appear to be undesirable therefore from the
standpoint of the international economic system. The safeguards policy that appears to
work best in terms of mitigating employment declines due to a broad import surge is when
all the industrializing countries act together to subsidize domestic output. In designing a
safeguards code in the GATT negotiations, the message of this research is that it might be
desirable to rule out tariff and quota measures and instead to specify that domestic
subsidies be used. This conclusion, it should be noted, is consistent with the central
theoretical message of our earlier discussion that the use of trade policy measures is
generally suboptimal. While it is not clear at the time of writing how the Uruguay Round
negotiations on safeguards will turn out, it may well be that a safeguards code will permit
the use of trade policies as well as domestic measures. If countries were then to use trade
polices for safeguards purposes, this could have undesirable international consequences for
the reasons that the aforementioned research has suggested.
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Negotiating Options in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Uruguay Round, which was launched officially in September 1986 and is
scheduled to be concluded at the end of 1990, is the eighth round of multilateral
negotiations that has been held under GATT auspices since the end of World War II.
Because there are many different trade liberalization options available to individual
countries and groups of countries, it is important to consider the potential economic effects
of these options in order to help define national interests and to suggest ways in which
tradeoffs may be chosen among the different items on the negotiating agenda. The
Michigan Model is well suited for this type of computational analysis. As mentioned
above, it was originally developed to analyze negotiating options in the Tokyo Round
negotiations. In this connection, Deardorff and Stern (1979) were commissioned by the
Senate Finance Committee of the U.S. Congress to the Michigan Model to evaluate the
actual offers that were negotiated in the Tokyo Round by the United States and other
major countries. This was done as part of the Committee's mandate to seek independent
and impartial studies of the possible economic effects of the negotiations as an input into
the Congressional deliberations on whether to ratify the changes in tariffs and other
policies that the U.S. had agreed to implement.
In Deardorff and Stern (1989b,c), we addressed the issue of multilateral trade
liberalization once again by analyzing several different scenarios pertinent to the ongoing
Uruguay Round. The scenarios were chosen to illustrate what might be expected to occur
if it were possible to eliminate completely existing tariffs and/or nontariff barriers (NTBs)
in the world's major trading countries. Of course, the scenarios chosen for analysis may
not in actuality correspond to what was being proposed in the Uruguay Round or what
might in fact actually be implemented. Nonetheless, we believed that the modeling results
would be useful in helping the United States and other countries choose among the
available options that would best serve their own national interests and in developing a
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consensus about which options might be mutually beneficial for the various countries
participating in the negotiations.
The scenarios analyzed were as follows:
1. Elimination of all post-Tokyo Round (1987) tariffs in the 18
major industrialized countries.
2. Elimination of NTBs in the major industrialized countries
(excluding agriculture and textiles and clothing).
3. Elimination of domestic agricultural production subsidies in the
major indstrialized countries.
4. Elimination of NTBs on textiles and clothing imports in the major
industrialized countries.
5. Elimination of all tariffs and NTBs in the major industrialized
countries (scenarios 1 + 2 + 3 + 4).
The results of each of these scenarios are too detailed to be reported here, but
some of the overall conclusions can be mentioned. For scenario 5, which involves
elimination of all existing barriers by the major industrialized countries, it was estimated
that world exports would rise by around $70 billion, which was an increase of 5.1% above
the 1980 level. U.S. exports would rise by an estimated $9 billion. The number of U.S.
workers who would have to change jobs was an estimated 285,000, which was only 0.29%
of the U.S. labor force. On a sectoral level, U.S. agriculture showed the largest estimated
increase in employment of about 2% of the 1980 agricultural labor force. Employment in
most other Major sectors varied by much smaller percentages, depending upon the
particular negotiating option chosen for eliminating tariffs and NTBs. Given the structure
of the Michigan Model and the different scenarios noted, it was possible to calculate
employment impacts by sector for each country in the model. These results disclosed
several instances in a number of countries in which there could be considerable dislocations
in labor markets if the trade liberalization were to take place all at once. This suggested
"
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the desirability of phasing in any liberalization over an extended period in an effort to
mitigate any adjustment costs that might occur.
While, as just mentioned, there were instances of sizable net employment changes
at the industry level in individual countries, the results also suggested that there were
many industries in which the estimated employment changes were relatively small for the
different scenarios analyzed. The reason for the small results is that the reductions in
tariffs were small, reflecting the fact the tariff rates had already been reduced appreciably
as the result of the seven previous rounds of GATT negotiations since the end of World
War II. Also, the tariff equivalents of the NTBs were on the whole fairly small. In
addition to the scenarios noted above, experiments were run involving the assumed
removal of tariffs in the major developing countries. In all previous GATT rounds, these
countries were exempted from having to reduce their tariffs. However, in the past decade
especially, the East Asian NICs have come under increasing pressure to reduce their
import restrictions. We thus calculated what might happen if trade barriers were to be
removed in all of the major industrialized and developing countries. The results suggested
an even larger increase in world exports than the 5.1% increase noted above for scenario 4
and, further, employment reductions in some sectors might be smaller because of the
broader liberalization involved.
Of course, the final negotiating positions of the United States and other
participants in the Uruguay Round will depend on how they view their interests as related
to both the reduction of tariffs and NTBs and the negotiation of rules governing other
items on the negotiating agenda, especially safeguards policies, international transactions
in services, and protection of rights to intellectual property (e.g., patents, copyrights, and
trademarks). In any event, the types of calculations that have been made using the
Michigan Model should be helpful in identifying the sectors in the United States and other
countries that are potential beneficiaries from greater liberalization as well as sectors that
could be vulnerable to the increased competitive pressures that liberalization may
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engender. Such information may therefore reinforce international cooperation and the
accomplishments of the GATT on important matters of trade policy in the international
economic system.
Unilateral/Multilateral Arms Trade Embargo
A question that has often been discussed is how important international trade in
armaments is to employment and output in individual industries in the United States and
other major countries and how these industries might be affected if this trade were to be
stopped. This question is obviously pertinent should it ever be possible to effect unilateral
or multilateral reductions of trade in armaments directly or via reductions in military
spending.
Grobar, Stern, and Deardorff (1989) have used the Michigan Model to investigate
the importance of international trade in armaments in the major Western industrialized
and developing countries. For this purpose, a data set of the exports and imports of
armaments for 1980 was constructed for the 34 Western countries included in the model.
The trade was disaggregated into military ships, aircraft, communications equipment, and
a variety of other military goods. Total exports of armaments by the major Western
countries were $18.3 billion in 1980, with the United States accounting for about one-third
of the total. The other major arms exporters included France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany. Israel was the largest arms exporter among the major developing
countries. The arms trade was concorded to seven industries included in the Michigan
Model that produce military goods: wood products; rubber products; iron and steel; metal
products; nonelectrical machinery; electrical machinery; and transport equipment.
It was then possible to calculate the ratios of military exports and imports to total
exports and imports for each of the industries for each country in the model. Using these
ratios, the importance of trade in military goods with respect to industry output and
employment in each country could be determined. The procedure was to assume, first,
that the United States imposed a unilateral embargo on its exports and imports of
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armaments. To implement this, it was assumed that the industry ratios of military to
total exports and imports were reduced to zero, and these values were entered as
exogenous changes in the model. The model was then solved to yield a variety of
percentage changes in the important economic variables by sector as well as economy-wide
weighted averages. Absolute changes were then calculated using the 1980 reference year
data. The second experiment involving a multilateral embargo was carried out on the
assumption that all of the countries in the model reduced their military trade ratios to
zero.
The estimated aggregate results of the unilateral U.S. arms trade embargo were
to reduce U.S. total exports and imports by about $2 billion, which was about 1% of their
1980 levels. Some 140 thousand U.S. workers were estimated to have to change jobs as
the result of the U.S. embargo. This was a comparatively small 0.14% of total 1980 U.S.
employment. There were similarly small changes in the U.S. terms of trade, the exchange
rate, and domestic prices. The aggregate effects. on the other countries were also small.
At the industry level, the largest estimated net reductions in U.S. employment were in
transport equipment (1.9% percent of 1980 employment) and electric machinery (1.7%).
These same sectors showed an expansion of employment in the other industrialized
countries.
The aggregate results for the multilateral embargo indicated a slightly larger
decline in U.S. total exports and imports as compared to the U.S. unilateral embargo. For
all countries, total exports and imports were reduced by more than $9.9 billion, which was
less than 1% of total 1980 trade. An estimated 118 thousand U.S. workers-0.12% of
1980 employment-were estimated to have to change jobs. At the sectoral level, the
results for the United States were similar to the U.S. unilateral embargo. But for other
countries, the results depended on whether they were net exporters or net importers of
military goods. France and Italy showed employment declines in the transport equipment
and electric machinery industries while Japan showed an increase in employment in these
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industries as did most of the smaller countries. In percentage terms, the detailed industry
results suggested that there might, be significant adjustment pressures in a number of
industries in several industrialized and developing countries, although the orders of
magnitude were not of major proportions in most instances.
The general conclusion of this analysis is that the importance of trade in
armaments for aggregate and sectoral employment in the United States and other major
Western trading countries should not be exaggerated. Of course, there is the larger
question of what the effects would be if a sizable reduction in domestic military spending in
the major countries were possible. In order to investigate this question, information is
needed on the sectoral composition of military spending to correspond to the trade in
military goods already included in the model. It would then be possible to use the model to
assess the aggregate and sectoral effects of unilateral and/or multilateral reductions in
military spending together with embargoes on trade in military goods.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether unilateral or multilateral arms trade
embargoes or reduced military spending can be attained. This will depend upon whether
the international political environment is conducive to making the necessary changes. To
the extent that economic analysis may be helpful in evaluating different alternatives and
informing actual decisions, the Michigan Model could be used to establish whether
particular policy options of reducing arms trade and/or domestic military expenditures
would be disruptive to aggregate and sectoral output and employment in the United States
and other major countries. The answer here would obviously depend on the size and
timing of the changes involved. Thus, in the analysis of negotiating options in the
Uruguay Round, we saw that the possibly disruptive effects of trade liberalization could be
mitigated by phasing in the reduction or rernoval of the tariffs and NTBs involved.
Presumably, reductions in military expenditures and trade could be phased in as well over
a period of years.
r
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Lessons from Computational Modeling
Having used the Michigan Model for several years to analyze a variety of trade
policy issues, we have learned a great deal about the advantages and drawbacks of
computational modeling.
The first and by far most significant lesson has been how important it is to have a
multicountry/multisector model in order to analyze the effects of changes in trade policies.
Time and again, it has been found that foreign tariffs and NTBs have a major impact on
an individual country in addition to the impact that the country's own policies may have.
A second lesson is that policy makers and their constituents are greatly concerned about
the employment and output effects of changes in trade policies in the short-to-medium run.
This concern underscores the need for a modeling capability that allows for disequilibrium
in labor markets in response to changes in trade policies. In using the Michigan Model,
close contact with staff economists in the U.S. Government agencies, the Congress, and
the major international organizations concerned with trade matters. The various papers
describing the model experiments and results have been widely circulated in government
circles, and, on occasion, government agencies have commissioned studies of important
trade policy issues using the Michigan Model. While it is difficult for to know whether the
computational results of the model have been taken explicitly into account in making policy
decisions, many government officials and their staff are certainly cognizant of the
capability and uses of the model.
Over the years, certain drawbacks of the Michigan Model have become evident.
These include the inability of the model to handle bilateral (as opposed to multilateral)
policy changes, problems of separating real from purely financial effects of policy changes,
and the need to take imperfect competition and economies of scale into account especially
in certain manufacturing industries. In continuing work on computational modeling, an
effort is being made to construct modeling options that address these limitations. It is
planned accordingly to continue providing computational estimates of the economic effects
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of actual and hypothetical changes in trade policies. Of course, political considerations will
ultimately govern the choice and implementation of policies. But government officials will
hopefully continue to find the computational results of the Michigan Model useful in
evaluating existing policies and deliberating among different options for making changes in
policies.
VI. Conclusion
An effort has been made in this chapter to demonstrate how issues of conflict in
international economic relations are handled conceptually in the theory of international
trade and international macroeconomics.
In order to illustrate how certain issues could be analyzed in a pragmatic manner,
we described briefly four applications of the Michigan Model of World Production and
Trade. In the cases of tariffs and safeguards policies, the focus was on how unilateral
U.S. actions would affect other countries. As far as tariffs are concerned, because of the
possibility of retaliation, the conclusion was that it would be best if the policy action were
not taken in the first place. With respect to safeguards policies, it appeared that the
preferred policy was a multilateral domestic production subsidy rather than a unilateral/
multilateral import tariff or quota. The analysis of negotiating options in the Uruguay
Round was intended to show how countries might choose to formulate their negotiating
positions and identify tradeoffs on particular options in the light of their national interests.
The emphasis here was on the employment effects of different options, and the setting was
one of cooperation for mutual gain by means of trade liberalization under the authority and
influence of the GATT. The focus of the experiments on unilateral/multilateral embargoes
of international trade in armaments was again on employment effects in the major
Western countries. It was shown in particular that the United States would experience
only comparatively minor employment shifts if trade in armarnents were eliminated.
Other countries might experience more disruption of employment, but the effects could be
mitigated by phasing in the changes in policies. In this last case, it would require
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agreement at the highest political levels to effect the reductions in trade armaments. In
reaching such a decision, it would be important to know how disruptive such changes
would be. The Michigan Model results suggest that the effects involved would be
manageable. If this conclusion were accepted by those countries concerned, then
cooperative steps could be taken to defuse the potential for conflict to arise as the result of
international trade in armaments.
The Michigan Model is only one example of the contribution that international
economists can make to the analysis of conflict and cooperation in the international
economic system. One can point to other economic modeling efforts that deal with
different aspects of the global trading and payments system. The insights from empirical
economic modeling thus have much to offer to analysts and government officials who are
involved in the international policy process.
a
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